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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
-------------0000000-------------
'.JI L11LRNESS BUILDING SYSTEMS 
INC and KERRY R. HUBBLE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CHARLES H. CHAPMAN and 
EDYTHE S. CHAPMAN, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 19009 
-------------00000000000-----------------
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
-------------00000000000-----------------
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Directed Verdict, entered 
against the Plaintiff-Appellant, after a jury had awarded the 
Plaintiff-Appellant $7,250.00. This was tried before the 
jury of three theories: (1) lien foreclosure, (2) breach of 
contract and (3) quantum merit. The jury verdict was set 
aside on the basis that the Plaintiff-Appellant was not a 
licensed contractor at the time of the contract between the 
parties. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully requests that the 
be reversed and remanded with instruction to enter 
- 1 -
judgment for the Plaintiff against the Dc,fe>nda11t -
amount of $7,250.00, along with interests and c0,l:· 
attorneys fees in the sum of $2,500.00. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the early spring of 1981, the Plaintitf auven· 
the sale of a "package home". This packaged home was a ''·'· 
cabin kit and consisted of the logs and certain limited 
struction materials. 
cur-
The Defendants answered the advertisement, put mcn 2 
down for the same, and subsequently purchased the same ou:r': 
During the months of May and June of 1981, the Defec:-
frequented the place of business of the Plaintiff to learn 
about the construction of said kit. Then, at or aboul the 
first of June, the parties entered into an agreement fot 
erection of said kit as follows: (1) the parties agreed:: 
the purchase of additional materials that were not included 
in the kit. Note Exhibit 4-P and (2) the Plaintiff agreerl · 
erect the kit, which consisted of these additional material· 
and the basic logs. Note Exhibit 5-P. It should be no'ec 
the Defendant was ;;oing to do all of the plumbing, electr'.,·:. 
work, insulation, water proofing, shingles, and all ·"' t'ic 
terior work, and the Plaintiff was only going to do t 1it ': .. 
work. 
At the time of trial, the Plaintiff and his Flll· 
testified that it was agreed at the time of the contracr 
the Plaintiff would work for the Defendant, and the Dd•c 
, 1 lie general contractor and building his own home. 
1."111 denied the same at trial and testified that he 
1 11 :ot I that the Plaintiff was not licensed when the work 
was tenninated. 
The Plaintiff worked through the surmner to erect the 
Defendants' kit. Through the course of the erection there 
were various change orders and finally in the month of August, 
the Defendant requested that the Plaintiff just put the roof 
on and be done. 
At this time, the Defendants engaged an attorney who 
wrote the Plaintiff a letter, indicating that since the 
Plaintiff was not licensed he could not collect for the work 
that he had done. The letter further stated that if the Plain-
tiff would leave the job and file no liens then the Defendant 
would take no action against the Plaintiff for contracting with-
out a license. Note Exhibit 18-P. 
However, Plaintiff demanded payment and the Defendants 
refused the same. 
Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed two liens, (1) for 
additional materials based upon the contract, Exhibit 4-P, 
and the change orders along the way, and (2) for labor. 
Note Exhibit 16-P for materials and 15-P for labor. 
Plaintiff filed suit to foreclose the said liens and 
three causes of action: (1) foreclose the liens, 
(2) damages stemming from breach of contract and (3) money 
damages from unjust enrichment. 
-3-
Defendants answered and counterclaim on th 0 h 1 . 
of a refund as well as for faulty workmanship, ead• 
on the fact that the Plaintiff was not licensed. 
After discovery was completed, the Defendants fi;t. 
a Motion for Partial Surnrnary Judgment, on the basis that 
Plaintiff was not a licensed contractor and hence his cor.c:. 
and particularly the one with the Defendants are void. '!Jc 
was heard on November 15, 1982, before the Honorable Homer' 
Wilkinson, District Judge, just three days before trial. 
According to the minute entry on page 58 of the file: 
'tourt finds that questions of fact have been raised that 
material thereby denies the motion and indicates that trial 
will take 2 days, it now being a jury trial, and it will pr: 
ceed on schedule." 
The trial proceeded as scheduled and the Plaintift 
on evidence to substantial the following: (1) That the De· 
fendants were as protected from inept and financially irresr: 
sible builders as they otherwise would have been if Plaintc'.'. 
had in fact been licensed. (2) That the Defendants knew or' 
have known that the Plaintiff was not licensed and still wer· 
ahead and did business with him, and reaped the benefit Jf i 
reduced price for his services because he was not a gener3'. 
tractor. (3) That there was a licensed contractor on locD 
who oversaw all the construction of the Defendants cat:1r· 
(4) That the Defendants were the sole owners of the pry. 
and that the cabin was being built by the Defendants anr! i:, 
it was for their oFn personal use. 
_ /, -
U11rin? the course of the trial, Court and counsel 
, ,, rl1:i1•1bers and reviewed and revised the jury instructions. 
, '"·111·' hours of the same, Judge Wilkinson drafted jury 
1,,,t,uclion 1!11, which reads as follows: 
You are instructed that the contract between the 
parties is enforceable if you find that all work 
was performed by a licensed contractor or the work 
done by defendants employees was completely super-
vised by a licensed contractor. 
Note the proposed jury instruction, as found on 
page 67, of the record, with the accompanying notation thereon, 
"Given in substance H.F.W." 
After the Plaintiff had put on his case, as set forth 
above, he rested and the Defendants made a motion for a directed 
verdict, which the Court took under advisement. 
Defendants thereafter, presented their case and the 
matter was submitted to the jury. 
Along with the regular jury instructions, a special 
verdict was submitted to and responded to by the jury as fol-
lows: 
(1) Do you find that the work done by the Plaintiff 
on the Defendants' cabin was performed by a licensed 
contractor or that the work of the employees was com-
pletely supervised by a licensed contractor? 
ANSWER: NO 
(2) Do you find that the Plaintiff materially complied 
with the plans, labor contract, material contract, and 
mutually agreed to changes made by the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant? 
ANSWER: NO 
-5-
(3) If your answer to question (1) and ( 1 1 1 -
yes then state what sum if anv the Plaint i Ii - 1 
entitled to recover for labor performeu dl1•i 
supplied. 
SUM 
(4) If your answer to Question 2 was no then stac" 
what sum if any the Defendant is entitled to recu\I( 
for Plaintiff's failure to comply with the Plaine''. 
plans, labor contract, material contract, and iM.:cJa .. 
agreed to changes made by the Plaintiff and 
SUM $ 
Dated this (19th) day of November, 1982 
(6:50 P.M.) 
(Melvin A. Jensen) 
JURY FOREPERSON 
While the jury was deliberating, Court and Counsel 
agreed that a reasonable attorneys fee, no matter who pre··ai -
was the sum of $2,500.00. 
Several days later, Defendants' Counsel noticed 11r 
his Motion for a Directed Verdict and the same was heard 
the Honorable Homer F. T.Jilkinson, District Judge, on Decemcc'. 
1982. 
The bottom of the minute entry reads as follows 
Court indicates that the defense at the time of 
trial when Plaintiff rested made a motion to dismi" 
and the Court took motion under advisement. Cour'. 
feels the question of whether the Plaintiff was a 
general contractor or not was a matter of lav an 1 
instructions given to the jury were not appropri 
Court finds that the Plaintiff was not a ?enPr ' 
tractor and not entitled to recover and ' 
case indicating the jury ruled on the counter -c' 
and it's (sic) verdict will stand. 
From this order, the Plaintiff appeals, and subm 1 ·' 
that the matter should be reversed and sent back to the J;-
,ir 1 1 L' enter judgment against the Defendants-Respondents 
'"""mt of $7,250.00 plus interests and costs, and an 
, , in the sum of $2,500.00 
In the alternative, Plaintiff submits that the matter 
ue remanded to the District Court with instructions to retry 
the matter with corrected jury instructions, so the Plaintiff 
can assert his claims for the total $9,272.45. 
STATEMENT OF THE LAW 
ARGUMENT ONE 
PLAINTIFF CAN COLLECT FOR BOTH LABOR AND MATERIALS 
WHEN HE SUPPLIES THE SAME TO AN OWNER BUILDING HIS 
OWN HOME FOR HIS OWN PERSONAL USE. 
In the facts of this case, the Plaintiff testified 
that he had several conversations with the Defendant Charles 
Chapman, to the effect that Plaintiff was not a licensed con-
tractor, but he could work for the Defendant and the Defendant 
could build his o•m home himself without be a general contractor. 
According to the building permit for the cabin, the 
same was taken out and signed for by the Defendant. Note Ex. 
28-D 
While it is true that the Defendant denied any such 
conversations and concommitantly any such agreement, Appellant 
s:1bmits that the matter should have been submitted to the jury. 
According to 58-23-2(5), Utah Code Annotated as amended 
i 11 l "Sole owners of property building structures thereon 
for their own use." are exempted from the statute requiring 
a contractors license. 
-7-
Then in 58-23-1, Utah Code Annotated as amende,1 
the legislature set forth what would be considered de 
facia evidence of one acting in the capacity of a contra 
Evidence of the securing of any construction or c 
permit from a governmental agency . . shall be , 
in any court of the State of Utah as prima facia 
of engaging in the business or acting in the capa,, 
a contractor. 
Hence, in the facts before this Court, the Plaint 1 
asserts that Defendants agreed to be the general contractcr 
and that he the Plaintiff would work for him, and that as d 
result the permit for the construction of the cabin was ta(, 
out by the Defendant. 
Consistent herewith, the Plaintiff submitted 
lowing jury instruction: (Note page 69 in the record) 
You are instructed that the Plaintiff need not be 
licensed and the contract between the parties is 
enforceable if you find all of the following (1) 
Defendants were the sole owners of the property, r: 
the Defendants were building the cabin on the said 
property and (3) the cabin was for the Defendants 
own use. 
(Denied H. F. W.) 
Appellant submits that this is error. Surely, as;, 
express in the statute, a person can build his own home wit 
being a licensed contractor. It may not be wise for him 
the same, but that is up to the legislature, and its exprv 
provision for the same surely was no oversight 
Respondent may contend that Defendant eouallv dt=·1 l 
the existence of such an arrangement, but that only raise 
-8- ----
,,p a question of fact which should have been submitted 
ARGUMENT TFO 
AN UNLICENSED CONTRACTOR CAN STILL COLLECT FOR BOTH 
HIS LABOR AND MATERIALS WHEN THE OWNERS ARE OTHERWISE 
PROTECTED FROM INEPT AND FINANCIALLY IRRESPONSIBLE 
BUILDERS. 
According to the testimony before the lower Court, 
the Plaintiff was to erect the log cabin kit and the Defendant 
was to do all of the additional work. ie: plumbing, electrical, 
shingles, water proofing, insulating, all interior work, etc. 
Essentially, the Plaintiff was to do the heavy work 
and the Defendant was to do the technical work. 
As a result, Plaintiff submits that it is hard to 
imagine someone embarking on the same without having a certain 
degree of both knowledge and expertise. 
In the case of Lignell vs. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, (Utah) 
1979, at page 805, the Supreme Court stated that the statute 
requiring individuals to be licensed was intended to protect 
the public. 
This Court has had frequent occasion to comment on the 
status of unlicensed contractors, and has persistently 
construed the cited statute as having been designed to 
protect the public and consequently to bar recovery by 
unlicensed contractors for services rendered under their 
contracts. The most recent Utah cases so holding are 
Mosely vs. Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 348, 453 P.2d 149, and 
Meridian Cor v. McGl n Garmaker Com any, Utah, 567 
P. T e rationa e o t ose cases is, however, 
that the party from whom the contractor seeks to recover 
is in the class the legislature intended to protect. 
A litigant is not a member of that class if the required 
_Q_ 
l;'rotec t ion (i.e. , against ineEi._.and f inane i a 11 
irresponsible builders) is in fact afforded 
another means. (emphasis added) 
In the facts before the Court, the "financiallv ir· 
sible" element, Appellant submits, is not applicable. The 
Defendant was the one purchasing all of the materials 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff was not to engage any subcontractoro 
nor materialmen, nor any laborers outside his own crews 
It should be noted that payment for labor, etc., 
due after performance of the contract, hence, no exposure t· 
the Defendants financially because they could withhold pa:nry 
until the Plaintiff had complied with the contract. 
Hence, any material was to be paid for by the Defer.:. 
pursuant to the agreement, as well as any additional costs 
subcontractors or laborors which the Defendant would havr 
engaged independant of the Plaintiff. So the Plaintiff be:c 
licensed or not licensed would have had no effect on the 
Therefore Plaintiff-Appellant submits that the only 
criteria is the "inept builders" criteria. 
In the Lignell, supra, case however, the Court co'1c. 
that because of the knowledge and expertise of the ovner' · 
were not in the class of those to be protected. Hence, tl• 
Court allowed recovery. 
Note significantly, the case of Fillmore 
vs. Western States, 561 P.2d 687, Utah, 1977, which holds 
when an individual engages one who he knows is not 1 icen'": 
-10- -
--
'r"d for him, he can not thereafter assert that he can 
, l; H,';l r from a valid debt, when the same was incurred with his 
k11t•wlE:Clgc, request and approval, and moreover his experience. 
So it is in this case, the Defendant-Respondent was 
to do all of the technical work both inside and out of his cabin. 
The Plaintiff was to do only the heavy work for the elderly 
couple, and the balance was to be completed by them. 
Plaintiff submits that because the Defendants were not 
members of the class intended to be protected by the statute 
requiring individuals to be license contractors, they are pre-
eluded from asserting that Plaintiff can not collect a just 
debt because he was in fact not licensed. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff submitted a jury instruction 
involving the same, as noted on page 68 in the record. 
You are instructed that the Plaintiff need not be 
licensed and the contract between the parties is 
enforceable if you find that the Defendants were 
as protected from inept and financially irresponsible 
builders, as they otherwise would have been if Mr. 
Hubble had in fact been licensed. 
(Denied H.F.W.) 
Plaintiff-Appellant submits that whether the Defendants 
Nere protected from inept and financially irresponsible builders, 
was a question of fact, and therefore should have been submitted 
r0 the jurv. 
ARGUMENT THREE 
THERE IS NO MECHANICAL RDLE DECLARING ALL CONTRACTS 
BY UNLICENSED CONTRACTORS VOID AND THE PENALTY SHOULD 
FIT THE OFFENSE. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated more recent! 
the provision in the Utah Code Annotated requiring inJi 
contracting to be licensed, should not be applied mech;-ini· 
to allow unjust enrichment. 
In Mosley vs. Johnson. Chief Justice CrocL:e· 
in his dissenting opinion states on page 154: 
In reference to this rule, Corbin on Contracts, 1.·o: 
Sec. 1512, observes that the rule which precludes . 
covery by one unlicensed to perform a particular 
should not be arbitrarily applied and that: 
*'"'"**id, even in these cases enforecment of the 
bargains is not always denied him. The statute ma·: -
clearly for protection against fraud and 
but in very many cases the statute breaker is neit>, 
fraudulent nor incompetent. He may have rendered e 
lent service or delivered goods of the highest qua:. 
his non-comoliance with the statute seems nearlv har 
and the real defrauder seems to be the defendanL 
enriching himself at the plaintiff's expense. Alt 1 .• 
many courts yearn for a mechanically applicable n;I, 
they have not made one in the present instances. 
re uires that the enalt should fit the crime' anr 
justice an soun o not a wa s re uire"'tl1e. 
orcement o icensing statutes y arge 
goinh not to the state but to repudiating defendan'.. 
(emp asis original) 
Also, in WhiDple vs. Fuller, 299 P. 2d 837, Utah, 
the Court stated on pages 838 and 839: 
For the appellant to escape liability on 
to be licensed theory" would subvert the 
As the California court said in Matchett 
P.2d 524, at page 529. 
"the fail 
the.Jr· 
c:),_il vs' 
-1, ' ' '" recovery can be had uµon the contract in 1 .. '-
absence of a license when eauity and good cnnsc 
dictate such relief as an alternative to a j 
which would convert a law intended "for the Sci 
protection of the public" into "an unwarranted 
for the avoidance of a just obligation." 
-12-
It was observed bv the Federal Circuit Court for the 
Tenth Circuit in our licensing statute: 
(·leither these statutory provisions nor any others 
called to our attention provide in express language 
that a contract employing an unlicensed contractor to 
perform services falling within the field of his trade 
shall be unenforceable * * * 
Note Dow vs. United States, for the Use and Benefit of 
154 F.2d 710. 
Note also Butterfield vs. Chaney, 366 P.2d 607, Utah, 
1961 and Platt vs. Locke, 358 P.2d 95, Utah, 1961. 
Even assuming that the Plaintiff had no agreement about 
the Defendant acting as his own contractor, according to the 
facts before this Court, the Defendant knew or should have known 
that Plaintiff was not licensed and still went ahead and did 
business with him. 
Consistent with the testimony of the Plaintiff, Exhibit 
5-P, states before itemizing the labor to be performed: 
Wilderness Building Systems proposes to perform 
all labor as necessary to complete the following 
by experienced or licensed personnel in good 
workmanlike manner. 
As a result, Plaintiff submitted the following jury 
instruction as found on page 70 of the record: 
Vou are instructed that the Plaintiff need not be 
licensed and the contract between the parties is 
enforceable if vou find that the Defendants knew or 
should have knoivn that the Plaintiff was not licensed 
and still went ahead and did business with him. 
(Denied H.F.W.) 
Counsel for the Plaintiff submits that it is hard to 
i!ll.1gine a more unfair and unjust situation than where an 
Lndivirlual knows that he is engaging the services of one who 
-13-
is not licensed, and reaps the benefit of a lower cu•! 
for so doing, and then when the work is completed he r1, 
pay for the same on the basis that the individual was 0 ,1 
licensed. 
Again, whether the Defendant-Respondent knew that 
Plaintiff was licensed or not was a question of fact, whic· 
should have been submitted to the jury. 
ARGUMENT FOUR 
AN UNLICENSED CONTRACTOR CAN COLLECT FOR BOTH LABOR 
AND M.ATERIALS IF THE WORK IS COMPLETELY SUPERVISED 
BY A LICENSED CONTRACTOR. 
In the case of Motivated Management International· 
Finney, 604 P. 2d 467, Utah, 1979, the Utah Supreme Court·· 
faced with a set of facts which Counsel submits are uniquEl 
similar to the case at bar. 
In that case, the Plaintiff was se 11 ing a "package( 
home". Plaintiff was doing the rough framing. Defendant 
to act as his own contractor. A licensed contractor overs2 
the work of the Plaintiff and was paid by the Plaintiff 
Plaintiff supplied the packaged home. Defendant received 
labor at a reduced price because he did not have to pav a 
contractor to do the same work. Defendant had the beneflr 
assistance of an architect. 
All in all the facts are almost identical to the ''' 
before this Court, as each of the aforesaid facts are true 
this case. 
According to the Motivated l"fanageme!lt case, 
-14- -
,, "''d l'untractor can collect for both labor and material 
t ':c •,cork is overseen by a licensed contractor. 
In the case before this Court, the Special Verdict, 
bv the jury, Counsel submits, is dispositive: 
(1) Do you find that the work done by the Plaintiff 
on Defendant's cabin was performed by a licensed 
contractor or that the work of the employees was 
completely supervised by a licensed contractor? 
ANSWER (Yes)YES NO 
This Court has very strongly recognized the right to 
trial by jury and the sanctity of their verdicts. 
In Efco Distributing, Inc. vs. Perry, 17 Utah 2d 375, 
412 P.2d 375, Utah, 1966, the Court stated: 
. unless some such error or impropriety as just 
stated is clearly sho"m, the verdict of the jury should 
stand. We have heretofore receited the values and the 
importance of trial by jury. It provides a means of 
protection of individual rights, and of redress against 
any form of injustice, real or imagined, by an appeal 
to a group of ordinary citizens as distinguished from 
being compelled to submit to any other authority. This 
method of settling disputes is the leaven in our system 
of law and justice which keeps it close to the people 
who are the ultimate source of power, both in the creation 
and in the enforcement of the law. For these reasons 
it is properly regarded an essential ajunct to and in 
harmony with, our whole democratic system which the Courts 
have taken care and exercised restraint to safeguard. 
Consistent with that viewpoint, when the parties 
have had the opportunity of presenting their evidence 
and arp;urnents concerning their dispute to the jury, 
the judgment of the jury should be allowed to swing 
through a wide arc within the limits of how reasonable 
minds might see the situation; and the court should 
not uoset a verdict merely because it may disagree. 
if it did so. the right of trial by jury would be 
effectivelv abrogated and the trial may as well be 
to the Court in the first place . 
- 1 'i-
It should be noted that the :Jefernhnt ra i scd 1 
that the Plaintiff was nnt a licensed contract"r on a 
Partial Summary JudgT'lent, just three davs before the tri 
The Honorable Homer Wilkinson. District Judge, ar· 
concluded, according to the minute entry· "Court finds •. ·· 
questions of fact have been raised that are material there: 
denies the motion and indicates that trial will take 2 
it now being a jury trial, and it will proceed on schedule 
Between the said motion and the trial, there was· 
change in the facts. Defendants arpued that the Plaintif'. 
not a licensed contractor at the time of the contract, 
Plain ti ff argued that he had a licensed contractor on sie": 
that oversaw the construction of the Defendants cabin 
The Special Verdict instruction, was prepared b-,·: 
Honorable Homer Wilkinson, again on the basis that a 
contractor cornpletelv suoervised the work. 
Counsel submits that in light of the Motivated 'ldl'i' 
case, supra, these Defendants Hould have been in no better 
of protection had the Plaintiff been licensed, and the j•1· 
verdict so holdine should not have been altered bv the C1 1u:: 
In conclusion, according to the facts, the Plain:: 
filed two liens. Exhibit 15-P for labor and Exhibit 16-r 
materials. 
Even assuminf! that the Plaintiff was not 
that he is therefore precluded from recovery for his 
is no basis to say that he is not entitled to be paid fc• 
materials. 
-16-
-,t .in J 11 should the Plaintiff be entitled to collect 
, r (, c 1 n:;ure basis, but he should on a breach of contract 
1,' i :inJ An unjust enrichment theory. It should be noted he 
('lea·l ornved, Counsel submits, each theory. 
SUMMARY 
Counsel submits that Plaintiff should be allowed to 
recnver to total amount sued upon on the basis that the Defendants 
were acting as their own contractor, and Plaintiff worked for 
him. The fact that the Defendant took out the permit is prima 
facia evidence that he was the contractor. Surely, the Plaintiff 
should be able to submit the same to the jury, the trier of fact. 
Plaintiff should be allowed to collect on the basis 
chat the Defendants were in exactly the same position as they 
have been, re: inept and irresponsible builders, if the 
Plaintiff had in fact been licensed. There was no exposure to 
the Defendants. The only ones who could make claim against the 
Defendants would be laborers of the Plaintiff, and the Defendants 
could have oaid them upon the return of a Lien Waiver. This 
couoled with the knowledve and experience of the Defendants 
outs is the exact position as if the Plaintiff had in 
been a licensed contractor. 
The penalty should fit the offense. According to the 
1 ,J•m of the Plaintiff, the Defendant enters into an agreement 
f0r the construction of his log cabin, for both labor and materials. 
0l'fendants knowino;ly engage the Plaintiff to do the same as an 
contractor. They pay less because of this fact, and 
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then refuse payment all together because t 1w l'Lti: 
licensed. Like one who uses the statute of ft t• 
fraud, Defendants cause a greater harm, than the lin·r"i:. 
statute was designed to prevent. The injustice perpetra·, 
by the Defendants is the most intollerable unjust enric11mr•:r: 
Lastly, the Defendants were protected to sarne de?Cc 
as they would have been if the Plaintiff was in fact 1 icens•·. 
as the jury concluded that the work was completelv super11isc•; 
by a licensed contractor. 
As a result, the matter should be reversed and sen: 
back to the lower Court with instructions to enter judgment 
for the Plaintiff and against the Defendants in the sum cf 
$7,250.00 plus interest and costs and attorneys fees on the 
amount of $2, 500. 00 on the has is of either, lien foredosun 
breach of contract or unjust enrichment. 
In the alternative, the matter should be reversed d: 
set back to the lower Court with instructions to enter j•Jdgr:· 
for the Plaintiff and against the Defendants in the sum ·:·f 
$4,831.45 plus interest and costs and attorneys fees in tr.e • 
of $2,500.00 on the basis of materials supplied. 
Should this Court find that none of the above rt'•' .. 
are appropriate, Counsel submits that this matter shnulJ 
versed and remanded to the lower Court, with instri1l'l'''' 
retry the matter on the basis of the excluded jurv in' 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2nd day of June, 1°83 
............. 11111111 
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